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Abstract
The nascent field of fair machine learning aims to ensure that decisions guided by algorithms
are equitable. Over the last several years, three formal definitions of fairness have gained promi-
nence: (1) anti-classification, meaning that protected attributes—like race, gender, and their
proxies—are not explicitly used to make decisions; (2) classification parity, meaning that com-
mon measures of predictive performance (e.g., false positive and false negative rates) are equal
across groups defined by the protected attributes; and (3) calibration, meaning that conditional
on risk estimates, outcomes are independent of protected attributes. Here we show that all
three of these fairness definitions suffer from significant statistical limitations. Requiring anti-
classification or classification parity can, perversely, harm the very groups they were designed
to protect; and calibration, though generally desirable, provides little guarantee that decisions
are equitable. In contrast to these formal fairness criteria, we argue that it is often preferable
to treat similarly risky people similarly, based on the most statistically accurate estimates of
risk that one can produce. Such a strategy, while not universally applicable, often aligns well
with policy objectives; notably, this strategy will typically violate both anti-classification and
classification parity. In practice, it requires significant effort to construct suitable risk estimates.
One must carefully define and measure the targets of prediction to avoid retrenching biases in
the data. But, importantly, one cannot generally address these difficulties by requiring that
algorithms satisfy popular mathematical formalizations of fairness. By highlighting these chal-
lenges in the foundation of fair machine learning, we hope to help researchers and practitioners
productively advance the area.
Keywords— Algorithms, anti-classification, bias, calibration, classification parity, decision analysis,
measurement error
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1 Introduction
In banking, criminal justice, medicine, and beyond, consequential decisions are often informed by statistical
risk assessments that quantify the likely consequences of potential courses of action (Barocas and Selbst,
2016; Berk, 2012; Chouldechova et al., 2018; Shroff, 2017). For example, a bank’s lending decisions might
be based on the probability that a prospective borrower will default if offered a loan. Similarly, a judge may
decide to detain or release a defendant awaiting trial based on his or her estimated likelihood of committing a
crime if released. As the influence and scope of these risk assessments increase, academics, policymakers, and
journalists have raised concerns that the statistical models from which they are derived might inadvertently
encode human biases (Angwin et al., 2016; O’Neil, 2016). Such concerns have sparked tremendous interest
in developing fair machine-learning algorithms.
Over the last several years, the research community has proposed a multitude of formal, mathemati-
cal definitions of fairness to help practitioners design equitable risk assessment tools. In particular, three
broad classes of fairness definitions have gained prominence. The first, which we call anti-classification,
stipulates that risk assessment algorithms not consider protected characteristics—like race, gender, or their
proxies—when deriving estimates.1 The second class of definitions demand classification parity, requiring
that certain common measures of predictive performance be equal across groups defined by the protected
attributes. Under this definition, a risk assessment algorithm that predicts loan default might, for example,
be required to produce similar false negative rates for white and black applicants. Finally, the third formal
fairness definition, known as calibration, requires that outcomes are independent of protected attributes af-
ter controlling for estimated risk. For example, among loan applicants estimated to have a 10% chance of
default, calibration requires that whites and blacks default at similar rates.
These formalizations of fairness have considerable intuitive appeal. It can feel natural to exclude pro-
tected characteristics in a drive for equity; and one might understandably interpret disparities in error rates as
indicating problems with an algorithm’s design or with the data on which it was trained. However, we show,
perhaps surprisingly, that all three of these popular definitions of algorithmic fairness—anti-classification,
classification parity, and calibration—suffer from deep statistical limitations. In particular, they are poor
measures for detecting discriminatory algorithms and, even more importantly, designing algorithms to sat-
isfy these definitions can, perversely, negatively impact the well-being of minority and majority communities
alike.
In contrast to the principle of anti-classification, it is often necessary for equitable risk assessment algo-
rithms to explicitly consider protected characteristics. In the criminal justice system, for example, women
are typically less likely to commit a future violent crime than men with similar criminal histories. As a result,
gender-neutral risk scores can systematically overestimate a woman’s recidivism risk, and can in turn en-
courage unnecessarily harsh judicial decisions. Recognizing this problem, some jurisdictions, like Wisconsin,
have turned to gender-specific risk assessment tools to ensure that estimates are not biased against women.
Enforcing classification parity can likewise lead to discriminatory decision making. When the true underlying
distribution of risk varies across groups, differences in group-level error rates are an expected consequence
of algorithms that accurately capture each individual’s risk. This general statistical phenomenon, which we
discuss at length below, is known as the problem of infra-marginality (Ayres, 2002; Simoiu et al., 2017).
Attempts to adjust for these differences often require implicitly or explicitly misclassifying low-risk members
of one group as high-risk, and high-risk members of another as low-risk, potentially harming members of
all groups in the process. Finally, we show that calibration, while generally desirable, provides only a weak
guarantee of equity. In particular, it is often straightforward to satisfy calibration while strategically mis-
classifying individuals in order to discriminate. Indeed, the illegal practice of redlining in banking is closely
related to such a discriminatory strategy. For example, to unfairly limit loans to minority applicants, a bank
could base risk estimates only on coarse information, like one’s neighborhood, and ignore individual-level
factors, like income and credit history. The resulting risk scores would be calibrated—assuming majority
and minority applicants default at similar rates within neighborhood—and could be used to deny loans to
creditworthy minorities who live in relatively high-risk neighborhoods. Similar discriminatory effects can
1The term “anti-classification” is popular among legal scholars, but it is not commonly used by computer scientists.
In general, given the interdisciplinarity and nacency of fair machine learning, a variety of terms are often used by
different authors to describe the same underlying concept. We have attempted to avoid ambiguity by explicitly
defining the key phrases we use.
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arise from inexperience rather than malice, with algorithm designers inadvertently neglecting to include
important predictors in risk models.
As opposed to following prevailing mathematical definitions of fairness, practitioners have long designed
tools that adhere to an alternative fairness concept. Namely, after constructing risk scores that best capture
individual-level risk—and potentially including protected traits to do so—similarly risky individuals are
treated similarly, regardless of group membership. For example, when determining which defendants to
release while they await trial, or which loan applicants to approve, decision makers would first select an
acceptable risk level and then release or fund those individuals estimated to fall below that threshold. As we
show below, this threshold policy follows widely accepted legal standards of fairness. Further, such a decision
strategy—with an appropriately chosen decision threshold—maximizes a natural notion of social welfare for
all groups. Importantly, however, this thresholding approach will in general violate classification parity,
and may additionally violate anti-classification, as some risk assessments use protected characteristics. The
underlying risk scores will typically satisfy calibration, but that is largely incidental; it is not the reason for
the normative appeal of the approach.
Statistical risk assessment algorithms are often built on data that reflect human biases in past decisions
and outcomes. As such, it is important to consider the ways in which problems with the training data can
corrupt risk scores. In particular, we focus on measurement error and sample bias. First, the outcome of
interest may be imperfectly observed, what we call label bias. For example, in the criminal justice system,
whites and blacks who commit the same offense are often arrested and convicted for those offenses at different
rates, particularly for low-level crimes, like minor drug use. Consequently, statistical models that predict fu-
ture arrests or convictions can systematically overstate recidivism risk for minorities. Unfortunately, there is
no easy solution to this measurement problem, since arrests and convictions are typically all that is observed.
Practitioners often combat this issue by focusing on outcomes less likely to exhibit such bias. For example,
instead of training models to predict arrests for minor crime, one can predict arrests for violent offenses,
which are believed to be less susceptible to measurement error (D’Alessio and Stolzenberg, 2003; Skeem and
Lowenkamp, 2016). Second, the predictive power of features can vary across groups, what Ayres (2002) calls
the problem of subgroup validity. For example, if arrests are differentially recorded across race groups, they
might also have differential predictive power. Even absent measurement error, it is in general possible for the
relationship between a predictor and outcome to differ across groups, potentially skewing estimates that ig-
nore such distinctions. However, when labels are accurately measured, this phenomenon can be countered by
fitting group-specific risk models that learn such idiosyncratic patterns—violating anti-classification. Indeed,
as mentioned above, this is precisely the rationale for employing gender-specific recidivism models. Finally,
one must take care to ensure that training data are representative of the population to which algorithms are
eventually applied. As a case in point, Buolamwini and Gebru (2018) found that commercial image analysis
programs have difficulty classifying the gender of dark-skinned individuals, a shortcoming that is potentially
due to the relative dearth of dark-skinned faces in popular facial analysis datasets.
In addition to addressing such potential problems with the data, it is important to consider the design
and analysis of decision algorithms in more complex environments. While single-threshold policies are often a
useful starting point, they do not work in all circumstances, particularly when externalities and equilibrium
effects may dominate the immediate, localized costs and benefits of decisions. For example, in banking,
one might improve the long-run distribution of wealth by setting different lending standards for different
groups; and in education, a diverse student body may yield benefits for all students (Page, 2008), similarly
justifying group-specific standards. Importantly, though, this complexity does not mean that the popular
formalizations of fairness we study can help one achieve equitable outcomes. Indeed, requiring either anti-
classification or classification parity can in fact exacerbate these problems.
The need to build fair algorithms will only grow over time, as automated decisions become even more
widespread. As such, it is critical to address limitations in past formulations of fairness, to identify best
practices moving forward, and to outline important open research questions. By reviewing and synthesizing
recent developments in fair machine learning, we hope to help both researchers and practitioners advance
this nascent yet increasingly influential field.
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2 Background
To ground our discussion of fair machine learning, we begin by reviewing the leading notions of discrimination
in economics and American law. We then formally define the concepts of algorithmic fairness described above,
and discuss some recent applications of these definitions.
2.1 Discrimination in law and economics
There are two dominant economic categories of discrimination, statistical (Arrow et al., 1973; Phelps, 1972)
and taste-based (Becker, 1957), both of which focus on utility. With statistical discrimination, decision
makers explicitly consider protected attributes in order to optimally achieve some non-prejudicial goal.
For example, profit-maximizing auto insurers may charge a premium to male drivers to account for gender
differences in accident rates. In contrast, with taste-based discrimination, decision makers act as if they have
a preference or “taste” for bias, sacrificing profit to avoid certain transactions. This includes, for example, an
employer who forfeits financial gain by failing to hire exceptionally qualified minority applicants. In Becker’s
original formulation of the concept, he notes that taste-based discrimination is independent of intent, and
covers situations in which a decision maker acts “not because he is prejudiced against them but because he
is ignorant of their true efficiency” (Becker, 1957).2
As opposed to utility-based definitions, the dominant legal doctrine of discrimination focuses on a decision
maker’s motivations. Specifically, equal protection law—as established by the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth
Amendment—prohibits government agents from acting with “discriminatory purpose” (Washington v. Davis,
1976). It bars policies undertaken with animus (i.e., it bars a form of taste-based discrimination, since acting
with animus typically means sacrificing utility); but it allows for the limited use of protected attributes to
further a compelling government interest (i.e., it allows a form of statistical discrimination). As one example,
certain race-conscious affirmative action programs for college admissions are legally permissible to further
the government’s interest in promoting diversity (Fisher v. University of Texas, 2016).
The equal protection doctrine has evolved over time, and reflects ongoing debates about the role of classi-
fication (use of protected traits) versus subordination (subjugation of disadvantaged groups) in discrimination
cases (Fiss, 1976). By law, it is presumptively suspect for government entities to explicitly base decisions on
race, gender, or other protected attributes, with such policies automatically triggering heightened judicial
scrutiny (Winkler, 2006). In this sense, the principle of anti-classification is firmly encoded in current legal
standards. Importantly, however, one can clear this hurdle by arguing that such classifications are necessary
to achieve equitable ends—as with affirmative action. There is thus recognition under constitutional law
that society’s interests are not always served by a mechanical blindness to protected attributes. Further,
several legal scholars have argued that courts, even when formally applying anti-classification criteria, are
often sympathetic to the potential effects of judgments on social stratification, indicating tacit concern for
anti-subordination (Balkin and Siegel, 2003; Colker, 1986; Siegel, 2003). Others, though, have noted that
such judicial support for anti-subordination appears to be waning (Nurse, 2014).
In certain situations—particularly those concerning housing and employment practices—intent-free eco-
nomic notions of discrimination are more closely aligned with legal precepts. Namely, under the statutory
disparate impact standard, a practice may be deemed discriminatory if it has an unjustified adverse effect on
protected groups, even in the absence of explicit categorization or animus (Barocas and Selbst, 2016).3 The
disparate impact doctrine was formalized in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. (1971). In 1955, the Duke Power Company instituted a policy that mandated employees have a high
school diploma to be considered for promotion, which had the effect of drastically limiting the eligibility of
black employees. The Court found that this requirement had little relation to job performance, and thus
2Some economists have re-interpreted taste-based discrimination as requiring intent (cf. Bertrand et al., 2005),
but we use the term as Becker originally defined it.
3The legal doctrine of disparate impact stems largely from federal statutes, not constitutional law, and applies
only in certain contexts, such as employment (via Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act) and housing (via the Fair
Housing Act of 1968). Apart from federal statutes, some states have passed more expansive disparate impact laws,
including Illinois and California. The distinction between statutory and constitutional rules is particularly relevant
here, as there is debate among scholars over whether disparate impact laws violate the equal protection clause and
are thus unconstitutional (Primus, 2003).
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deemed it to have an unjustified—and illegal—disparate impact. Importantly, the employer’s motivation
for instituting the policy was irrelevant to the Court’s decision; even if enacted without discriminatory pur-
pose, the policy was deemed discriminatory in its effects and hence illegal. Note, however, that disparate
impact law does not prohibit all group differences produced by a policy—the law only prohibits unjustified
disparities. For example, if, hypothetically, the high-school diploma requirement in Griggs were shown to be
necessary for job success, the resulting disparities would be legal.
In modern applications of statistical risk assessments, discriminatory intent is often of secondary concern—
indeed, many policymakers adopt algorithms in part to reduce bias in unaided human decisions. Instead,
the primary question is whether algorithms inadvertently lead to discriminatory decisions, either through
inappropriate design or by implicitly encoding biases in the data on which they are built. As such, our
discussion of fairness below draws heavily on the economic concept of taste-based discrimination and its
counterpart in the law, unjustified disparate impact.
2.2 Defining algorithmic fairness
To formally define measures of algorithmic fairness, we first introduce the notion of decision rules. Suppose
we have a vector xi ∈ Rp that we interpret as the visible attributes of individual i. For example, x might
represent a loan applicant’s age, gender, race, and credit history. We consider the problem of fairly selecting
between one of two possible actions, a0 and a1. In the context of banking, a0 may correspond to granting
a loan application and a1 to denying it; in the pretrial domain, a0 may correspond to releasing a defendant
awaiting trial and a1 to detaining that individual. A decision algorithm, or a decision rule, is any function
d : Rp 7→ {0, 1}, where d(x) = k means that action ak is taken.
We next present several additional assumptions and notational conventions that are helpful in stating
and investigating common fairness definitions. First, we assume x can be partitioned into protected and
unprotected features: x = (xp, xu). For ease of exposition, we often imagine the protected features indicate
an individual’s race or gender, but they might also represent other attributes. Second, for each individual,
we suppose there is a quantity y ∈ {0, 1} that specifies the target of prediction. For example, in the pretrial
setting, we might set yi = 1 for those defendants who would have committed a violent crime if released, and
yi = 0 otherwise. Importantly, y is not known to the decision maker, who at the time of the decision has
access only to information encoded in the visible features x. Third, we define random variables X and Y
that take on values X = x and Y = y for an individual drawn randomly from the population of interest (e.g.,
the population of defendants for whom pretrial decisions must be made). We use Xp and Xu to denote the
projections of x onto its protected and unprotected components. Fourth, we define the true risk function
r(x) = Pr(Y = 1 | X = x). Finally, we note that many risk assessment algorithms, instead of simply
outputting a decision a0 or a1, produce a risk score s(x) that may be viewed as an approximation of the
true risk r(x). In reality, s(x) may only be loosely related to the true risk, and s(x) may not even lie in the
interval [0, 1] (e.g., s(x) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10} may represent a risk decile). To go from risk scores to decisions, it
is common to simply threshold the score, setting d(x) = 1 if and only if s(x) ≥ t for some fixed threshold
t ∈ R.
With this setup, we now describe three popular definitions of algorithmic fairness.
Anti-classification. The first definition we consider is anti-classification, meaning that decisions do not
consider protected attributes. Formally, anti-classification requires that:
d(x) = d(x′) for all x, x′ such that xu = x′u. (1)
Some authors have suggested stronger notions of anti-classification that aim to guard against the use of unpro-
tected traits that are proxies for protected attributes (Bonchi et al., 2017; Grgic-Hlaca et al., 2016; Johnson
et al., 2016; Qureshi et al., 2016). We will demonstrate, however, that the exclusion of any information—
including features that are explicitly protected—can lead to discriminatory decisions. As a result, it is
sufficient for our purposes to consider the weak version of anti-classification articulated in Eq. (1).
Classification parity. The second definition of fairness we consider is classification parity, meaning
that some given measure of classification error is equal across groups defined by the protected attributes.
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In particular, we include in this definition any measure that can be computed from the two-by-two con-
fusion matrix tabulating the joint distribution of decisions d(x) and outcomes y for a group. Berk et al.
(2017) enumerate seven such statistics, including false positive rate, false negative rate, precision, recall,
and the proportion of decisions that are positive. We also include the area under the ROC curve (AUC),
a popular measure among criminologists and practitioners examining the fairness of algorithms (Skeem and
Lowenkamp, 2016).4
Two of the above measures—false positive rate, and the proportion of decisions that are positive—
have received considerable attention in the machine learning community (Agarwal et al., 2018; Calders and
Verwer, 2010; Chouldechova, 2017; Edwards and Storkey, 2015; Feldman et al., 2015; Hardt et al., 2016;
Kamiran et al., 2013; Pedreshi et al., 2008; Zafar et al., 2015, 2017; Zemel et al., 2013). Formally, parity in
the proportion of positive decisions, also known as demographic parity (Feldman et al., 2015), means that
Pr(d(X) = 1 | Xp) = Pr(d(X) = 1), (2)
and parity of false positive rates means that
Pr(d(X) = 1 | Y = 0, Xp) = Pr(d(X) = 1 | Y = 0). (3)
In our running pretrial example, demographic parity means that detention rates are equal across race groups;
and parity of false positive rates means that among defendants who would not have gone on to commit a
violent crime if released, detention rates are equal across race groups. Demographic parity is not strictly
speaking a measure of “error”, but we nonetheless include it under classification parity since it can be com-
puted from a confusion matrix. We note that demographic parity is also closely related to anti-classification,
since it requires that a classifier’s predictions d(X) be independent of protected group membership Xp.
Calibration. Finally, the third definition of fairness we consider is calibration, meaning that outcomes
should be independent of protected attributes conditional on risk score. In the pretrial context, calibration
means that among defendants with a given risk score, the proportion who would reoffend if released is the
same across race groups. Formally, given risk scores s(x), calibration is satisfied when
Pr(Y = 1 | s(X), Xp) = Pr(Y = 1 | s(X)). (4)
Note that if s(x) = r(x), then the risk scores trivially satisfy calibration.
2.3 Utility functions and threshold rules
When developing risk assessment tools in practice, it is common to first approximate the true risk r(x) with
a score s(x) = rˆ(x), and then set d(x) = 1 if and only if rˆ(x) ≥ t for some fixed threshold t—we call these
threshold rules. For example, in the banking context, one may deny loans to all applicants considered a
high risk of default; and in the pretrial context, one may detain all defendants considered a high risk of
committing a violent crime if released.
This strategy, while not explicitly referencing fairness, satisfies a compelling notion of equity, with all
individuals evaluated according to the same standard.5 When the threshold is chosen appropriately, threshold
rules also satisfy the economic and legal concepts of fairness described above. To see this, we follow Corbett-
Davies et al. (2017) and start by partitioning the aggregate costs and benefits of decisions for each individual.
4The AUC of risk scores s(x) is defined as follows. Suppose X+ is the feature vector for a random individual with
label y = 1; for example, in the pretrial setting, X+ is the feature vector for a random individual who ultimately
recidivates. Similarly define X− to be the feature vector for a random individual with label y = 0. Then the AUC
of s(x) is Pr(s(X+) > s(X−)). In particular, given a random individual who ultimately recidivates and one who
ultimately does not, the AUC is the probability that the one who recidivates is rated higher risk. Perfect risk scores
would thus have 100% AUC, and completely uninformative risk scores would have 50% AUC.
5Threshold rules have received relatively little attention in the recent literature on fair machine learning. For
example, this notion of equity was not included in a popular list of fairness definitions by Berk et al. (2017). Dwork
et al. (2012) allude to a related concept by considering a constraint in which “similar individuals are treated similarly”;
that work, however, does not operationalize similarity, nor does it explicitly consider statistical risk.
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Let b00 ≥ 0 be the benefit of taking action a0 when y = 0, and let b11 ≥ 0 be the benefit of taking action a1
when y = 1. For example, in the pretrial domain, b00 is the value of releasing a defendant who would not
recidivate if released, and b11 is the value of detaining a defendant who would recidivate if released. If we
think of the decision as a binary prediction of the outcome, then b00 and b11 are the values of true negatives
and true positives, respectively. Likewise denote by c01 ≥ 0 the cost of taking action a0 when y = 1, and
denote by c10 ≥ 0 the cost of taking action a1 when y = 0. Then c01 and c10 can similarly be thought of as
the costs of false negatives and false positives, respectively.
Now, since r(x) is the probability that y = 1, the expected utility u(0) of taking action a0 is given by,
u(0) = b00(1− r(x))− c01r(x)
= b00 − (b00 + c01)r(x),
and the expected utility u(1) of taking action a1 is given by,
u(1) = −c10(1− r(x)) + b11r(x)
= −c10 + (c10 + b11)r(x).
Note that u(0) is a decreasing linear function of r(x), and u(1) is an increasing linear function of r(x).
Consequently, after rearranging terms, we have that u(1) ≥ u(0) if and only if
r(x) ≥ b00 + c10
b00 + b11 + c01 + c10
. (5)
Thus, for a risk-neutral decision maker, the optimal action is a1 when r(x) is sufficiently large, and otherwise
the optimal action is a0. Further, if the costs and benefits above are the same for all individuals, and if
rˆ(x) = r(x), a threshold rule with t = (b00 + c10)/(b00 + b11 + c01 + c10) produces optimal decisions for
each person. As a result, threshold rules—under the utility framework we have laid out—ensure there is no
taste-based discrimination or unjustified disparate impact.
In many domains, it is convenient to re-parameterize the utility above into more easily interpreted
quantities. For example, in the pretrial context, the most salient costs are associated with the direct social
and financial effects of detention, which we call cdet, and the most salient benefits result from crime prevented,
which we call bcrime. Accordingly, the value b11 of a true positive is bcrime − cdet, and the cost c10 of a false
positive is cdet. The value b00 of a true negative and the cost c01 of a false negative are both 0, since no one
is detained—and hence no crime is prevented—in either case. By Eq. (5), u(1) ≥ u(0) when
r(x) ≥ b00 + c10
b00 + b11 + c01 + c10
= cdet/bcrime.
In particular, if the value of preventing a crime is twice the cost of detaining an individual, one would detain
defendants who have at least a 50% chance of committing a crime. A threshold rule ensures that only the
riskiest defendants are detained while optimally balancing the costs and benefits of incarceration.
Threshold rules are predicated on the assumption that errors are equally costly for all individuals.
However, under a threshold rule, error rates generally differ across groups, violating classification parity.
This disconnect highlights the counterintuitive nature of classification parity, an issue we discuss at length in
Section 3. Threshold rules can also violate anti-classification, since the most statistically accurate risk scores
rˆ(x) may depend on group membership. These risk scores typically do satisfy calibration. However, we note
that a risk score s(x) that is calibrated need not approximate the true risk r(x). To give an extreme example,
s(x) = 1− r(x) is calibrated yet inversely related to risk, and would accordingly yield poor decisions.
In some cases, the costs and benefits of decisions are largely internalized within communities. For
example, since the majority of violent crime is committed by someone known to the victim (Harrell, 2012),
the benefits of detaining a high-risk defendant mostly accrue to members of the defendant’s community.6
Similarly, a borrower reaps the benefits of being issued a loan but also bears the costs of default—in terms
of fees, penalties, and effects on future credit. Any spillover benefits (such as real-estate development raising
6There is likewise evidence that most violent crime is intra-racial (O’Brien, 1987).
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the value of neighboring properties) or costs (such as foreclosure lowering neighboring property values) also
mostly accrue to the borrower’s community.7 In these situations—and assuming the costs and benefits of
decisions are approximately equal for all individuals—the threshold rule that maximizes aggregate social
welfare also maximizes utility for each community considered in isolation.
The general approach outlined above is quite flexible, and can be used to approximate costs and benefits
in a variety of situations. There are, however, several subtleties that one must consider in practice, a point we
return to in Section 4. First, the costs and benefits of decisions might vary across individuals, complicating
the analysis. For example, it may, hypothetically, be more socially costly to detain black defendants than
white defendants, potentially justifying group-specific decision thresholds (Huq, 2019). Second, decision
makers may not be risk neutral. A risk adverse decision maker might prefer the certainty of a lower expected
payoff over one that is greater in expectation but uncertain. When uncertainty differs across individuals
or groups, one might again reasonably deviate from a simple threshold rule. Third, resource constraints
might mean we cannot take the higher-utility action for all individuals. For example, there may be more
qualified borrowers than a lender has the capital to finance. In such circumstances, policymakers might
decide to prioritize the well-being of certain groups over others. Finally, decisions might involve significant
externalities, where the value of taking some action for an individual depends on what actions are taken
for others. In this case, decisions cannot be considered in isolation, limiting the value of threshold rules.
Despite these complications, threshold rules are often a natural starting point. More generally, a utility-
based framework, in which one explicitly details the costs and benefits of actions, is a useful paradigm for
reasoning about policy choices.
2.4 Applications of formal fairness criteria
Several authors have applied formal fairness criteria to evaluate existing decision algorithms. Perhaps most
prominently, a team of investigative journalists at ProPublica reported that the popular COMPAS algorithm
for recidivism prediction had higher false positive rates for black defendants than for whites—a finding widely
interpreted as meaning the tool was biased against blacks (Angwin et al., 2016) (cf. Chouldechova, 2017,
for discussion). The false positive rate metric has likewise been applied to assess algorithms for credit
scoring (Hardt et al., 2016) and for child welfare services (Chouldechova et al., 2018). Others have examined
whether algorithmic predictions in criminal justice have similar AUC across protected groups, a form of
classification parity (Skeem and Lowenkamp, 2016), and whether such predictions are calibrated (Skeem
et al., 2016).
Moving beyond diagnostics, a large body of work in computer science has proposed procedures for
satisfying various fairness definitions. For example, Hardt et al. (2016) developed a method for constructing
randomized decision rules that ensure true positive and false positive rates are equal across protected groups,
a form of classification parity that they call equalized odds; they further study the case in which only false
positive rates must be equal, which they call equal opportunity. Agarwal et al. (2018) similarly propose a
technique for constructing algorithms that satisfy various forms of classification parity, including equality
of false positive rates. Many papers, particularly early work in fair machine learning, proposed algorithms
to achieve demographic parity via pre-processing, post-processing, and regularization techniques (Agarwal
et al., 2018; Calders and Verwer, 2010; Edwards and Storkey, 2015; Feldman et al., 2015; Kamiran et al., 2013;
Pedreshi et al., 2008; Zemel et al., 2013). Corbett-Davies et al. (2017) show that among all algorithms that
satisfy demographic parity, the utility-maximizing rule uses different decision thresholds for each protected
group; they similarly show that such multiple-threshold rules maximize utilty among algorithms that satisfy
parity of false positive rates. Finally, several papers have suggested algorithms that enforce a broad notion of
anti-classification, which prohibits not only the explicit use of protected traits but also the use of potentially
suspect “proxy” variables (Grgic-Hlaca et al., 2016; Johnson et al., 2016; Qureshi et al., 2016). Recently,
researchers have further expanded the idea of anti-classification to create algorithms that avoid potentially
suspect causal paths (Bonchi et al., 2017; Datta et al., 2017; Kilbertus et al., 2017; Kusner et al., 2017; Nabi
and Shpitser, 2018).
7A bank’s optimal lending threshold might not coincide with the socially optimal threshold, necessitating a trade
off between private and public utility (Liu et al., 2018). However, once one determines the appropriate trade-off, a
threshold rule still maximizes utility.
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Complicating these efforts to develop fair algorithms, several researchers have pointed out that many
formal fairness definitions are incompatible (cf. Berk et al., 2017, who survey fairness measures and their
incompatibilities). For example, Chouldechova (2017) shows that various classification parity constraints
(specifically, equal positive/negative predictive values, and equal false positive/negative rates) are incom-
patible if base rates differ across groups. Kleinberg et al. (2017b) prove that except in degenerate cases,
no algorithm can simultaneously satisfy calibration and a particular form of classification parity.8 Corbett-
Davies et al. (2016, 2017) and Pleiss et al. (2017) similarly consider the tension between calibration and
alternative definitions of fairness.
This fast growing literature indicates the importance that many researchers place on formal, mathe-
matical definitions of fairness, both as diagnostics to evaluate existing systems and as constraints when
engineering new algorithms. Further, the impossibility results have been widely viewed as representing an
unavoidable and unfortunate trade-off, with one desirable notion of fairness sacrificed to satisfy another,
equally desirable one. However, as we discuss below, prevailing definitions of fairness typically do not map
on to traditional social, economic or legal understandings of the concept. As a result, these formalizations
are often ill-suited either as diagnostics or as design constraints. In particular, one can view the impossibility
theorems as primarily identifying incompatibilities between various problematic fairness criteria, rather than
as establishing more fundamental limits on fair machine learning.
3 Limitations of prevailing mathematical definitions of fairness
We now argue that the dominant mathematical formalizations of fairness—anti-classification, classification
parity, and calibration—all suffer from significant limitations which, if not addressed, threaten to exacerbate
the very problems of equity they seek to mitigate. We illustrate our points by drawing on a variety of
statistical, legal, and economic principles, coupling our theoretical analysis with empirical examples.
3.1 Limitations of anti-classification
Perhaps the simplest approach to designing an ostensibly fair algorithm is to exclude protected characteristics
from the statistical model. This strategy ensures that decisions have no explicit dependence on group
membership. However, the history of the United States shows that clearly discriminatory behavior is possible
even without using protected characteristics. For example, literacy tests were employed up until the 1960s
as a facially race-neutral means of disenfranchising African Americans and others. This possibility has
prompted many to argue that one should not only exclude protected attributes but also their “proxies”.
We note, however, that it is difficult to operationalize the definition of a “proxy”, leading to a panoply of
competing approaches. In part, this is because nearly every covariate commonly used in predictive models
is at least partially correlated with protected group status; and in many situations, even strongly correlated
covariates may be considered legitimate factors on which to base decisions (e.g., education in the case of
hiring).9 We circumvent this debate over proxies by arguing that there are important cases where even
protected group membership itself should be explicitly taken into account to make equitable decisions. Once
we establish that there is value to including protected traits themselves in risk models, the role of proxies
largely becomes moot.
Consider our recurring example of pretrial recidivism predictions. After controlling for the typical “le-
gitimate” risk factors, including criminal history, age, and substance use, women reoffend less often than
men in many jurisdictions (DeMichele et al., 2018; Skeem et al., 2016). Consequently, gender-neutral risk
assessments tend to overstate the recidivism risk of women. Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon, plotting
8Specifically, Kleinberg et al. (2017b) show that, except in trivial cases, the following three properties cannot be
simultaneously achieved: (1) calibration; (2) balance for the negative class, meaning that E[s(X) | Y = 0, Xp] =
E[s(X) | Y = 0]; and (3) balance for the positive class, meaning that E[s(X) | Y = 1, Xp] = E[s(X) | Y = 1].
9Legal definitions of proxies tend to focus on intent, where an unprotected trait x′ is considered a proxy for
a protected trait xp if the decision maker intends for x
′ to be a replacement for xp. Though such an intent-based
definition can be useful in discrimination cases involving human decision makers, it is not as well-suited for evaluating
algorithmic systems.
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Figure 1: The observed recidivism rate for men and women as a function of their (gender-neutral)
COMPAS score, based on data from Broward County, Florida. Because women reoffend at lower
rates than men with similar criminal histories, the gender-neutral COMPAS score overstates recidi-
vism risk for women. If these risk estimates were used to make decisions, relatively low-risk women
would be detained while higher-risk men were released. In this case, adhering to anti-classification
would produce taste-based discrimination against female defendants.
the observed recidivism rate for men and women in Broward County, Florida as a function of their gender-
neutral COMPAS risk scores. In particular, women with a COMPAS score of seven recidivate less than 50%
of the time, whereas men with the same score recidivate more than 60% of the time. Said differently, women
with a score of seven recidivate about as often as men with a score of five, and this two-point differential
persists across the range of scores. By acknowledging the predictive value of gender in this setting, one
could create a decision rule that detains fewer people (particularly women) while achieving the same public
safety benefits. Conversely, by ignoring this information and basing decisions solely on the gender-neutral
risk assessments, one would be engaging in taste-based discrimination against women.
At least anecdotally, some judges recognize the inequities associated with gender-neutral risk scores, and
mentally discount the stated risk for women when making pretrial decisions. Further, some jurisdictions,
including the state of Wisconsin, combat this problem by using gender-specific risk assessment tools, ensuring
that all judges have access to accurate risk estimates, regardless of an individual’s gender. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court recently affirmed this use of gender-specific risk assessment tools as “[promoting] accuracy
that ultimately inures to the benefit of the justice system including defendants” (State v. Loomis, 2016).10
When gender or other protected traits add predictive value, excluding these attributes will in general
lead to unjustified disparate impacts; when protected traits do not add predictive power, they can be safely
removed from the algorithm. But we note one curiosity in the latter case. If protected attributes are not
predictive, one could in theory build an accurate risk model using only examples from one particular group
(e.g., white men). Given enough examples of white men, the model would learn the relationship between
features and risk, which by our assumption would generalize to the entire population. This phenomenon
highlights a tension in many informal discussions of fairness, with scholars advocating both for representative
training data and for the exclusion of protected attributes. In reality, representative data are often most
important precisely when protected attributes add information, in which case their use is arguably justified.11
10The case examined the use of gender-specific risk assessment tools for sentencing decisions, though a similar logic
arguably applies in the pretrial setting. We also note that Loomis challenged the use of gender on due process grounds.
The court did not rule on the possibility of an equal protection violation, although it did write that “if the inclusion
of gender promotes accuracy, it serves the interests of institutions and defendants, rather than a discriminatory
purpose.”
11Representative data can help in two additional ways. First, a representative sample ensures that the full support
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Figure 2: Hypothetical risk distributions and a decision threshold (in the right-most plot). When
risk distributions differ, infra-marginal statistics—like the precision and the false positive rate of a
decision algorithm—also differ, illustrating the problem with requiring classification parity.
3.2 Limitations of classification parity
Classification parity is not strictly a single fairness criterion, but rather a family of criteria that includes
many of the most popular mathematical definitions of fairness. Starting with some aggregate measure of
algorithmic performance, classification parity requires that measure be equal across groups. Commonly, the
measures of performance are computed from an algorithm’s group-specific confusion matrix. For example, as
noted above, Angwin et al. (2016) found that the COMPAS risk assessment tool had a higher false positive
rate for black defendants in Broward County, and had a higher false negative rate for white defendants.
These differences led the authors to argue that COMPAS was biased against black defendants. In response,
the developers of COMPAS countered that false positive and negative rates were flawed measures of fairness;
they instead advocated for ensuring equality in positive and negative predictive values across race, which
COMPAS achieved (Dieterich et al., 2016).12 All four metrics are derived from COMPAS’s confusion matrices
for black and white defendants, so arguments that some combination of them should be equalized are all
arguments for some type of classification parity. Here we demonstrate that in fact all such statistics computed
from a confusion matrix are problematic measures of fairness.
Risk distributions. To understand the problems with classification parity, we must first understand risk
distributions. Recall that the (true) risk function is defined by r(x) = Pr(Y = 1 | X = x). In the pretrial
context, it is the probability that a defendant with observable features x will recidiviate if released. Let
DA = D(r(X) | X ∈ A) denote the distribution of r(X) over some subpopulation A. For example, DA may
be the distribution of true risk among white defendants, or alternatively, the distribution of true risk among
black defendants. Figure 2 shows hypothetical risk distributions for two different groups. In the left-most
plot, the two distributions have similar variances but different means; in the center plot, the distributions
have the same mean but different variances. In general, we would expect any two groups—defined by race,
gender, or any other attributes—to have risk distributions with different means and with different variances.
By the law of iterated expectations, the mean of DA equals Pr(Y = 1 | X ∈ A). In the pretrial case, the
of features is present at training time. We note, though, that one might have adequate support even without a
representative sample in many real-world settings, including criminal justice applications, particularly when models
are trained on large datasets and the feature space is relatively low dimensional. Second, a representative sample can
help with model validation, allowing one to assess the potential effects of group imbalance on model fit. In particular,
without a representative sample, it can be difficult to determine whether a model trained on a single group generalizes
to the entire population.
12Dieterich et al. (2016) also consider equality of AUC across race groups, a form of classification parity that they
call “accuracy equity”, which is approximately satisfied by COMPAS. We note that some authors use “calibrated”
to describe decisions d(X) ∈ {0, 1} that produce equal positive and negative predictive values (i.e., where Pr(Y = 1 |
d(X), Xp) = Pr(Y = 1 | d(X))). Our definition of calibration—which is more common in the literature—applies to
scores, not decisions, although the two definitions are equivalent if the score is binary and s(X) = d(X). Thresholding
a calibrated, multi-valued score will not, in general, result in a decision that produces equal positive and negative
predictive values (see Section 3.3).
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mean of a group’s risk distribution is the group’s overall rate of recidivism if all members of the group were
released. As a result of this property, if two groups have different base rates, their risk distributions will
necessarily differ, regardless of which features x are used to compute risk. The shape of the risk distribution
about its mean depends entirely on the selection of features x; specifically, it depends on how well these
features predict the outcome. Roughly, if risk is strongly related to the outcome, DA will have most of its
mass near zero and one (i.e., it will have high variance), while if the features are not particularly informative
then most of the mass will lie near its mean.
As discussed in Section 2.3, the utility-maximizing decision rule is one that applies a threshold to the
risk scores. In the pretrial setting, for example, one might detain all defendants above a certain risk level.
Starting from any other decision algorithm, one could switch to a threshold rule and detain fewer defendants
while achieving the same public safety benefits. In this sense, threshold rules are the unique rules that do
not lead to unjustified disparate impacts, and hence satisfy strong legal and economic notions of fairness.
Given a risk distribution and a threshold, nearly every quantity of interest in algorithmic fairness can
be computed, including all measures based on a confusion matrix, the area under the ROC curve (AUC),
and the average risk of individuals for whom Y = 0 (i.e., the “generalized false positive rate” proposed by
Kleinberg et al., 2017b).13 For example, as illustrated in the right-most plot of Figure 2, the proportion of
people labeled positive is the fraction of the distribution to the right of the threshold; and the precision of
a classifier is the conditional mean of the distribution to the right of the threshold. Furthermore, since the
risk distribution is fully defined by the choice of features and outcomes, these quantities are determined as
soon as X, Y , and t are chosen. Importantly, Y and t are generally constrained by policy objectives, and
X is typically constrained by the available data, so there is often little room for algorithm designers to alter
the risk distribution.
The problem of infra-marginality. With this background, we now describe the limitations of clas-
sification parity. Because the risk distributions of protected groups will in general differ, threshold-based
decisions will typically yield error metrics that also differ by group. This fact is visually apparent in Figure 2
(right-most plot) for one such metric, the precision of the classifier. Because the tails of the distributions
differ across groups, one can visually see that the precision also differs across groups. The same discrepancy
occurs for false positive rate—and for every other common error metric—though not all of these are as easily
visualized.
This general phenomenon is known as the problem of infra-marginality in the economics and statistics
literatures, and has long been known to plague tests of discrimination in human decisions (Ayres, 2002; Simoiu
et al., 2017). In short, the most common legal and economic understandings of fairness are concerned with
what happens at the margin (e.g., whether the same standard is applied to all individuals). What happens at
the margin also determines whether decisions maximize social welfare, with the optimal threshold set at the
point where the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs. However, popular error metrics assess behavior
away from the margin, hence they are called infra-marginal statistics. As a result, when risk distributions
differ, standard error metrics are often poor proxies for individual equity or social well-being.
To the extent that error metrics differ across groups, that tells us more about the shapes of the risk
distributions than about the quality of decisions. In particular, it is hard to determine whether differences
in error rates are due to discrimination or to differences in the risk distributions. This phenomenon is shown
in Figure 3, which plots precision and false positive rate as a function of a group’s base rate and the AUC of
the group’s risk scores. The figure was generated by assuming risk scores follow a discriminant distribution
(Pierson et al., 2018), a type of logit-normal mixture that is well-suited to modeling risk distributions because
it is naturally parameterized in terms of its mean and AUC. At a given threshold, both the precision and
false positive rate increase with the base rate, with the false positive rate particularly sensitive to changes
in the base rate. Further, for a fixed AUC and base rate, the false positive rate decreases in the threshold.
As a result, a higher false positive rate for one group relative to another may either mean that the higher
false positive rate group faces a lower threshold, indicating discrimination, or, alternatively, that the group
has a higher base rate. Precision, in contrast, increases with the threshold, holding the AUC and base rate
fixed. Accordingly, a lower precision for one group may either mean that the group faces a lower threshold
13The latter quantities—AUC and generalized false positive rate—depend only on the risk distribution and do not
require a threshold.
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Figure 3: The effect of different risk distributions on precision and false positive rate. At a given de-
cision threshold, the metrics can differ dramatically depending on a group’s risk distribution, param-
eterized here by base rate and AUC. This phenomenon illustrates the problem of infra-marginality,
in which common error metrics are poor proxies for taste-based discrimination.
or that the group has a lower base rate.
Infra-marginality in practice. The problem of infra-marginality is not merely a hypothetical pos-
sibility. Figure 4 shows estimated risk of violent recidivism for white and black defendants based on the
Broward County COMPAS data (Larson et al., 2016). These distributions were generated by fitting an
elastic net that predicts future arrests for violent offenses using all features in the dataset, including the
original COMPAS risk scores designed to predict violent criminal activity. As in the stylized distributions
of Figure 2, the empirical distributions plotted in Figure 4 differ considerably across groups. Consequently,
threshold rules—which hold all individuals to the same standard—violate classification parity.
One might attribute differences in the estimated risk distributions in Figure 4 to problems with the
statistical risk algorithm or with the dataset on which it was trained. But we caution against that conclusion.
As noted above, when base rates of violent recidivism differ across groups, the true risk distributions will
necessarily differ as well—and this difference persists regardless of which features are used in the prediction.
The empirical data suggest that 21% of black defendants in Broward County are rearrested for violent
offences, compared to 12% of white defendants. Though these rearrest rates are only approximations of the
true, unobserved recidivism rate (a point we discuss in Section 4), they do suggest that there are indeed
real differences between the two subpopulations. Of course, differences in recidivism rates are themselves
a product of past social and economic discrimination. That fact, however, does not mean that statistical
estimates of current, individual-level risk are inaccurate, or that better policy outcomes could be achieved
by altering risk scores to satisfy classification parity. Policymakers may strive to reduce group differences,
and they may debate the appropriate course of action to accomplish that goal, but we believe it would
be misleading to characterize an algorithm or its training data as unfair for accurately identifying existing
statistical patterns.
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Figure 4: Estimated distributions of violent recidivism risk for white and black defendants in the
COMPAS dataset (Larson et al., 2016). Because the shapes of the risk distributions differ, threshold
decisions necessarily mean that metrics like false positive rate also differ, illustrating the inherent
problems with those metrics as measures of fairness.
The effect of classification parity on group well-being. When risk distributions differ, enforcing
classification parity can often decrease utility for all groups. Under relatively mild assumptions, Corbett-
Davies et al. (2017) show that the optimal way to achieve classification parity is by setting different decision
thresholds for different groups. Specifically, they show that among all decision rules that satisfy parity of
false positive rates, utility (as defined in Section 2.3) is maximized by implementing group-specific decision
thresholds. They similarly show that such multiple-threshold rules maximize utility among all algorithms
satisfying demographic parity, though the optimal thresholds for satisfying demographic parity will in general
differ from those necessary to optimally satisfy parity of false positive rates. Most importantly, the thresholds
required to optimally satisfy these classification parity constraints will typically differ from the optimal
thresholds for any community. Thus, requiring classification parity (or even approximate parity) can hurt
majority and minority groups alike.
Consider, for example, the risk distributions from Broward County depicted in Figure 4, where we
suppose that the vertical line at 25% is the utility-maximizing detention threshold (i.e., we suppose that
cdet/bcrime = 0.25, meaning that society is willing to detain four individuals to prevent one additional violent
crime). Then the utility-maximizing way to equalize false positive rates is by setting a 17% threshold for black
defendants and a 31% threshold for white defendants. Likewise, the optimal way to achieve demographic
parity is by setting a 16% threshold for black defendants and a 31% threshold for white defendants. In
either case, whites face an overly strict detention threshold. Moreover, if the costs of releasing a high-risk
defendant mostly fall on members of that defendant’s community (e.g., when violent crime in a community
is mostly committed by members of that community), then black communities experience harms due to an
overly lenient detention threshold. In this example, members of both groups could be made better off by
relaxing the requirement that the decisions satisfy classification parity. Importantly, this scenario is not a
corner case designed to highlight the limitations of classification parity, nor is it a result of our assumption
that the optimal threshold is 25%. When risk distributions differ, classification parity is typically costly to
all groups, regardless of how society balances the relative costs of crime and detention.
Additional misconceptions about false positive rates. We conclude our discussion of classifi-
cation parity by highlighting two popular misconceptions specific to equalizing false positive rates. First, one
might believe that a difference in group-level false positive rates indicates an informational disparity. In our
pretrial example, this view suggests that the higher observed false positive rate for black defendants relative
to whites results from using less predictive features for blacks. Accordingly, some have argued that requiring
parity of false positive rates creates an incentive for algorithm designers to collect better information on the
higher error-rate group—black defendants in this case (Hardt et al., 2016).
While this argument is intuitively appealing, it is again important to consider the shape of risk distri-
butions. As discussed above, risk distributions differ whenever base rates differ, regardless of the features
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Figure 5: False positive rates are a poor proxy of the predictive power of features, as measured by
AUC. By ignoring observable differences between low and high-risk black defendants, one simulta-
neously lowers AUC and false positive rates. In this case, parity of false positive rates is achieved
when the risk scores for black defendants are barely better than random, with an AUC of 0.57.
collected, and so one would expect false positive rates to differ even when predictions are based on high-quality
information.14 Indeed, in the pretrial example in Figure 4, the AUC of predictions for black defendants (0.76)
is slightly higher than the AUC for whites (0.75), despite the much higher false positive rate for black de-
fendants.15 Further, degrading predictions can, in certain circumstances, lower a group’s false positive rate.
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows how false positive rate changes as we reduce the
predictive quality of risk estimates for black defendants. Specifically, we degrade predictions by combining
progressively larger subgroups of low-risk and high-risk black defendants, and then assigning them new risk
scores equal to the average risk of the combined subgroups. This transformation is tantamount to ignoring
information that could be used to tease apart the defendants. As a result, the risk distribution of black de-
fendants becomes increasingly concentrated around its mean, lowering the proportion of defendants—both
those who would have reoffended and those who would not have—above the decision threshold. (As in
Figure 4, we fix the decision threshold at 25%.) We find that false positive rates are equalized when the
black risk scores are barely better than random, with an AUC of 0.57. Importantly, those black defendants
who are ultimately detained when we achieve false positive rate parity are not the riskiest ones—they are
simply unlucky.
A second misconception is that the false positive rate is a reasonable proxy of a group’s aggregate well-
being, loosely defined. As above, however, this belief ignores the close relationship between false positive
rates and risk distributions. Suppose, hypothetically, that prosecutors start enforcing low-level drug crimes
that disproportionately involve black individuals, a policy that arguably hurts the black community. Further
suppose that the newly arrested individuals have low risk of violent recidivism, and thus are released pending
trial. This stylized policy change alters the risk distribution of black defendants, adding mass to the left-hand
tail. As a result, the false positive rate for blacks would decrease. To see this, recall that the numerator
of the false positive rate (the number of detained defendants who do not reoffend) remains unchanged
while the denominator (the number of defendants who do not reoffend) increases. Without considering the
distribution of risk—and in particular, the process that gave rise to that distribution—false positive rates
can be a misleading measure of fairness.
14A classifier that perfectly predicts outcomes would have a false positive rate of zero, and one would thus achieve
error-rate parity even if groups have different base rates. In general, though, when there are differences in base rates,
there are also differences in false positive rates.
15Like the other error-rate metrics we have discussed, AUC is closely tied to the shape of a group’s risk distribution,
and we would thus expect AUC to in general differ across groups. Nevertheless, because AUC naturally adjusts for
differences in base rates, it is arguably a reasonable—if imperfect—measure of aggregate predictive performance.
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Figure 6: Calibration is not sufficient to prevent discrimination. Starting from the true risk distri-
bution (in blue), one can pair low-risk and high-risk individuals to produce new, calibrated scores
(in red) that are concentrated around the group mean. In this manner, a decision maker can alter
the proportion of individuals that lie above the decision threshold.
3.3 Limitations of calibration
When criminologists and practitioners develop or audit a risk assessment tool, they typically check that risk
scores are calibrated (Danner et al., 2016; DeMichele et al., 2018; Flores et al., 2016; Skeem and Lowenkamp,
2016). Calibration ensures that risk scores s(x) mean the same thing for all protected groups—for example,
that white and black defendants given a risk score of 7 indeed recidivate at comparable rates. Without this
property, it is unclear how s(x) can be said to quantify risk at all. However, while important, calibration is
insufficient to ensure that risk scores are accurate or that decisions are equitable.
To see this, imagine a bank that wants to discriminate against black applicants. Further suppose that:
(1) within zip code, white and black applicants have similar default rates; and (2) black applicants live in
zip codes with relatively high default rates. Then the bank can surreptitiously discriminate against blacks
by basing risk estimates only on an applicant’s zip code, ignoring all other relevant information. Such scores
would be calibrated (white and black applicants with the same score would default equally often), and the
bank could use these scores to justify denying loans to nearly all black applicants. The bank, however, would
be sacrificing profit by refusing loans to creditworthy black applicants,16 and is thus engaged in taste-based
discrimination. This discriminatory lending strategy is indeed closely related to the historical (and illegal)
practice of redlining, and illustrates the limitations of calibration as a measure of fairness.
This redlining example can be generalized by directly altering a group’s risk distribution. As in Sec-
tion 3.2 above, we can aggregate low-risk and high-risk individuals and re-assign them risk scores equal to
the group average. This procedure results in calibrated scores having a distribution that is concentrated
around the group mean, as shown in Figure 6. Depending on where the mean lies relative to the decision
threshold, this process can be used to change the number of individuals receiving positive or negative classi-
fications. For example, assuming that the average minority bank applicant would not qualify for a loan, one
could discriminate against minorities by altering the minority risk distribution to be concentrated around
its mean, as in the redlining example above. Alternatively, assuming that the average white defendant is
relatively low risk, one could discriminate against minorities by concentrating the white distribution around
its mean, ensuring that no white defendants are detained. These examples illustrate the importance of
considering all available data when constructing statistical risk estimates; assessments that either intention-
ally or inadvertently ignore predictive information may facilitate discriminatory decisions while satisfying
calibration.
16These applicants are creditworthy in the sense that they would have been issued a loan had the bank used all
the information it had available to determine their risk.
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Figure 7: Discriminating using calibrated, coarsened scores. The left panel shows the risk distri-
butions for two groups, and the group-specific thresholds used to define the three risk categories.
The right panel shows that these categories are calibrated. However, by detaining only defendants
in the “high risk” category (those above the dotted thresholds in the left panel), the decision maker
has successfully discriminated against the red group, who face a lower threshold than defendants
from the blue group; in this case, there are red defendants who are detained while equally-risky blue
defendants are released.
In practice, it is common for risk assessments to be reported on a discrete scale (e.g., “low”, “medium”,
or “high”) rather than as real-valued probability estimates. Although this strategy may aid interpretation
by human decision makers, it further complicates the role of calibration in assessing fairness. One sensible
way to create discrete risk categories is to bin the underlying continuous probability estimates. Applying
a threshold at any point on the discrete scale is then equivalent to thresholding the true risk, ensuring
that no taste-based discrimination is present. However, when risk distributions differ and the number of
categories is small, this strategy will typically not produce scores that are calibrated on the discrete scale—a
phenomenon akin to the problem of infra-marginality.17 In the extreme case—where risk scores are coarsened
into just two categories, “low” and “high”—calibration on the discrete scale is equivalent to requiring a form
of classification parity (specifically, both parity of positive predictive values and parity of negative predictive
values), and is problematic for the same reasons. For example, Figure 7 shows how calibrated, discrete
scores can mask taste-based discrimination, where different thresholds are used to bin individuals into risk
categories. One must accordingly be careful when assessing the calibration of discretized risk scores.
4 Open challenges for designing equitable algorithms
We have thus far focused on the shortcomings of mathematical definitions of fairness, but it is equally
important to identify a path forward, both for researchers and for policymakers. Unfortunately, there is no
simple procedure or metric to ensure algorithmic decisions are fair. We can, however, enumerate some of the
key principles and challenges for designing equitable algorithms. We specifically focus here on four broad
issues: (1) measurement error; (2) sample bias; (3) model form, including model interpretability; and (4)
externalities and equilibrium effects.
Measurement error. In our above discussion, we have assumed that algorithmic decisions are based
on an individual’s true risk r(x) = Pr(Y = 1 | X = x), a condition that implicitly requires that we have
accurate measures of both y and x. We call measurement errors in these quantities label bias and feature
17Note, however, that the miscalibration produced by this strategy will never exceed one unit on the discrete scale;
members of every group in a given risk category will always be riskier on average than members of any group in
a lower risk category. Thus, COMPAS’s 2-point gender miscalibration shown in Figure 1 is still problematic even
though we should not in general expect perfect calibration when risk is converted into deciles.
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bias, respectively, and address them both in turn below. We argue that label bias often poses significant
challenges to constructing equitable risk scores, and indeed label bias is perhaps the most serious obstacle
facing fair machine learning. Feature bias, however, can often be dealt with more easily in practice, though
complications still remain.
In our running pretrial example, we take y to indicate whether a given defendant would commit a
violent crime if released. But there are two key difficulties with this assumption. First, though we might
want to measure violent crime conducted by defendants awaiting trial, we typically only observe crime
that results in a conviction or an arrest. These observable outcomes, however, are imperfect proxies for
the underlying criminal act. Further, heavier policing in minority neighborhoods might lead to black and
Hispanic defendants being arrested, and later convicted, more often than whites who commit the same
offense (Lum and Isaac, 2016). Poor outcome data might thus cause one to systematically underestimate the
risk posed by white defendants. The second, related, issue is that y is a counterfactual outcome; it denotes
what would have happened had a defendant been released. In reality, we only observe what happened
conditional on the judge’s actual detention decision.
There are no perfect solutions to the general problem of label bias. However, at least in certain applica-
tions, one can mitigate these tricky statistical issues. For example, criminologists have found that arrests for
violent crime—as opposed to drug crime—may not in fact suffer from substantial racial bias.18 In particular,
Skeem and Lowenkamp (2016) note that the racial distribution of individuals arrested for violent offenses is in
line with the racial distribution of offenders inferred from victim reports, and is also in line with self-reported
offending data. In other cases, like lending, where one may seek to estimate default rates, the measured
outcome (e.g., failure to pay) corresponds exactly to the event of interest. Even the problem of estimating
counterfactuals can be partially addressed in many applications. In the pretrial setting, Angwin et al. (2016)
measure recidivism rates in the first two-year period during which a defendant is not incarcerated; this is
not identical to the desired counterfactual outcome—since the initial detention may be criminogenic, for
example—but it seems like a reasonable estimation strategy. Further, unaided human decisions often exhibit
considerable randomness, a fact that can be exploited to facilitate statistical estimation of counterfactual
outcomes (Jung et al., 2017; Kleinberg et al., 2017a). More generally, a spate of recent work at the intersec-
tion of machine learning and causal inference (Hill, 2011; Jung et al., 2018; Mullainathan and Spiess, 2017)
offers hope for more gains in counterfactual estimation.
We next turn to measurement errors in the predictors x. As alluded to above, minorities who commit
drug crimes are more likely to be arrested than whites who commit the same offenses (Ramchand et al.,
2006). Consequently, when past criminal behavior is inappropriately used to predict future activity, such
feature bias can skew risk estimates. Suppose, for example, that true risk increases monotonically in the
number of past drug sales one has committed, and further suppose that one uses arrests for past drug
sales as a proxy for those committed transactions. Now consider a white and black defendant who have
carried out the same number of drug sales, and who accordingly have similar true risk. Because the black
defendant is likely to have had more drug arrests, he would (incorrectly) be rated higher risk than the
white defendant, illustrating the problem of feature bias. Fortunately, in the absence of label bias (i.e.,
measurement error in y), such feature bias is statistically straightforward to address. Specifically, one can
include group membership (e.g., race and gender) in the predictive model itself, or alternatively, one can
fit separate risk models for each group. In this manner—and under the assumption that y is accurately
measured—the statistical models would automatically learn to appropriately weight predictors according to
group membership. For example, when predicting violent recidivism, a model might learn to down-weight
past drug arrests for black defendants.
Such measurement error in x is closely related to what Ayres (2002) calls subgroup validity, the property
that features are equally predictive across groups. However, subgroup validity is a more general phenomenon,
as the relationship between x and y may plausibly differ across group even when predictors and labels are
18D’Alessio and Stolzenberg (2003) find evidence that white offenders are even somewhat more likely than black
offenders to be arrested for certain categories of crime, including robbery, simple assault, and aggravated assault.
Measurements of minor criminal activity, like drug offenses, are more problematic. For example, there is evidence
that drug arrests in the United States are biased against black and Hispanic individuals, with minorities who commit
drug crimes substantially more likely to be arrested than whites who commit the same offenses (Ramchand et al.,
2006). Although this pattern is well known, many existing risk assessment tools still consider arrests or convictions
for any new criminal activity—including drug crimes—which may lead to biased estimates.
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accurately measured. For example, among defendants with (truly) similar past criminal behavior, men and
women may in fact recidivate at different rates. As with feature bias, a simple statistical solution to this
problem is to explicitly account for group membership when estimating risk. As discussed in Section 3.1,
some jurisdictions indeed apply gender-specific risk models to address this issue. It is also common for
algorithm designers to exclude features with differential predictive power (Danner et al., 2015). However,
while perhaps a reasonable strategy in practice, we note that discarding information may inadvertently lead
to the redlining effects mentioned in Section 3.3.
We note one final complication with measuring labels and features. In many settings, and one may be able
to gather better data with greater investment of time and money. For example, recidivism predictions might
be improved by collecting more comprehensive information on a defendant’s criminal history, a process that
is often costly and requires coordinating with multiple jurisdictions. In theory, this additional information
may lead to welfare gains, and policymakers must accordingly evaluate the relative costs and benefits to all
groups of exerting this extra effort when designing algorithms. In practice, there is often diminishing returns
to information, with a relatively short list of key features providing most of the predictive power (Jung et al.,
2017), at least partially mitigating this concern.
Sample bias. In addition to addressing measurement error, it is important to minimize sample bias
when constructing risk scores. Ideally, one should train algorithms on datasets that are representative of the
populations on which they are ultimately applied. Though this is often challenging in practice, failure to
do so can lead to unintended, and potentially discriminatory, consequences. For example, Buolamwini and
Gebru (2018) found that commercial facial analysis tools struggle to correctly classify the gender of dark-
skinned individuals—and of dark-skinned women in particular—a disparity that is potentially attributable
to the relative dearth of dark-skinned faces in two popular facial analysis datasets. Sample bias can similarly
plague pretrial risk assessments, as it is often logistically challenging to develop tools that are tailored to
local criminal justice populations. For example, the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS) was developed
on a sample of 452 Ohio defendants, but is now used in jurisdictions nationwide (Latessa et al., 2010). To
the extent that Ohio defendants are not representative of those in other jurisdictions, ORAS may provide
poor risk estimates. More recent criminal justice assessments address this shortcoming by training models
on larger and more diverse samples. For example, the Public Safety Assessment (PSA) is based on 1.5
million cases from approximately 300 jurisdictions across the United States (Milgram et al., 2014). A further
challenge is that risk assessments are often adopted as part of a broader bail reform effort that changes the
distribution of defendants for whom pretrial decisions must be made. Therefore, even data from the same
jurisdiction could suffer from sample bias if used to train a model to make predictions in the new regime.
As with measurement error, there is no complete solution to the problem of sample bias. In many
settings, it may be prohibitively difficult to obtain representative data. For example, smaller jurisdictions
may simply not have enough historical cases to train statistical models on local populations. Nevertheless, as
in all situations, one must carefully weigh the potential costs and benefits of adopting a necessarily imperfect
risk assessment tool relative to the other feasible options. In particular, even an imperfect algorithm may
in some circumstances be better than leaving decisions to similarly imperfect humans who have their own
biases. As we discuss briefly below, simple, transparent models can also mitigate some of these concerns
with the training data.
Model form and interpretability. To create risk scores from a set of features x and labels y, one
must faithfully map the relationship between x and y. When the feature space is low-dimensional and the
training data are abundant, the precise statistical strategy chosen has little effect on the resulting estimates.
Though this is an admittedly best-case scenario, it is not far from reality in some common risk assessment
applications. For example, statistical models for estimating recidivism or default risk are often based on
hundreds of thousands of examples and a small number of predictive features (e.g., the COMPAS risk model
uses only six variables).19 When the feature space is high-dimensional or the training data are less plentiful,
19Dressel and Farid (2018) write that COMPAS’s risk assessment is based on 137 inputs. However, Equivant,
the creator of COMPAS, states that their pretrial risk assessment algorithm uses only six features, writing that the
additional information relates to “needs factors and are NOT used as predictors in the COMPAS risk assessment” (cf.
http://www.equivant.com/blog/official-response-to-science-advances, emphasis in original). Other common
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it becomes important to carefully consider the precise functional form of the statistical estimator, an ongoing
challenge in supervised machine learning more broadly. One promising approach was recently proposed by
Hashimoto et al. (2018), who describe a strategy for controlling the worst-case estimation error for arbitrary
groups.
In the risk assessment community, there is a growing push to design statistical models that are simple,
transparent, and explainable to domain experts. In traditional machine learning applications, researchers
have often willingly accepted complexity in exchange for accuracy. This drive for predictive performance has
resulted in algorithms capable of extraordinary feats, but ones that are also increasingly hard to understand.
However, a risk assessment tool is only useful if it is adopted by practitioners; a complicated or opaque
algorithm may engender mistrust from policymakers and other stakeholders, hindering implementation.
Transparency can even become a legal requirement when society demands to know how algorithmic decisions
are made (Goodman and Flaxman, 2016). Finally, simpler models may better transfer from one population to
another by capturing general relationships rather than idiosyncratic patterns, partially alleviating concerns
about sample bias in the training data. The newly active field of interpretable machine learning has already
made significant strides, developing predictive algorithms that are both accurate and explainable (Doshi-
Velez and Kim, 2017; Jung et al., 2017; Zeng et al., 2016), but there is still more work to do.
Externalities and equilibrium effects. Finally, we highlight the challenge of understanding fairness
in more complex environments. Most of our discussion has ignored potential externalities and equilibrium
effects, but there are important settings where these considerations come to the fore. For example, some
decisions are better thought of as group rather than individual choices. In university admissions, a diverse
student body may benefit the entire institution (Page, 2008), creating interdependencies between applicants.
Predictive algorithms can also create feedback loops, leading to unintended consequences. As Lum and Isaac
(2016) note, if police officers are deployed based on statistical predictions of criminal activity, that may
entrench historical patrolling patterns, since crime is more likely to be recorded in locations were officers
were previously stationed. Such a scenario can be viewed as a particularly pernicious form of label bias. In
an employment scenario, Hu and Chen (2018) describe a dynamic, theoretical model where applying group-
based thresholds incentivizes under-represented groups to invest in education and training, leading to a better
long-term equilibrium in which group-based thresholds are no longer needed. Deploying an algorithm can
also change the behavior of more distant actors in a complex system. For example, a pretrial risk assessment
tool could change the upstream actions of officers and prosecutors who compensate for the expected outcomes
of their decisions. Such potential equilibrium effects have implications for the overall utility of an algorithmic
intervention; moreover, if these tools alter the populations to which they are applied, risk assessments may
also become less accurate over time if they are not continually updated. While it is easy to enumerate such
potential complications, it is admittedly difficult to quantify their effects or to translate such observations to
actionable insights. Nevertheless, it is useful for researchers and policymakers to at least be aware of these
broader issues when designing and deploying algorithmic systems.
5 Conclusion
From criminal justice to medicine, practitioners are increasingly turning to statistical risk assessments to help
guide and improve human decisions. Algorithms can avoid many of the implicit and explicit biases of human
decisions makers, but they can also exacerbate historical inequities if not developed with care. Policymakers,
in response, have rightly demanded that these high-stakes decision systems be designed and audited to ensure
outcomes are equitable. The research community has responded to the challenge, coalescing around three
mathematical definitions of fairness: anti-classification, classification parity, and calibration. Over the last
several years, dozens of papers have applied one or more of these measures either to audit existing systems
or as constraints when developing new algorithms. However, as we have aimed to articulate, these popular
measures of fairness suffer from significant statistical limitations. Indeed, enforcing anti-classification or
classification parity can often harm the very groups that these measures were designed to protect.
pretrial risk assessments, like the Public Safety Assessment (PSA), similarly base their estimates on a small number
of factors (Milgram et al., 2014).
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How, then, should one design equitable algorithms? At a high-level, we first stress the importance of
grounding technical and policy discussions of fairness in terms of real-world quantities. For example, in
the pretrial domain, one might consider a risk assessment’s short and long-term impacts on public safety
and the size of the incarcerated population, as well as a tool’s alignment with principles of due process. In
lending, one could similarly consider a risk assessment’s immediate and equilibrium effects on community
development and the sustainability of a loan program. Formal mathematical measures of fairness only
indirectly address such issues, and can inadvertently lead discussions astray. Of course, it is not always clear
how best to quantify or to balance the relevant costs and benefits of proposed algorithmic interventions.
In some cases, it may be possible to conduct randomized controlled trials; in other cases, the best one can
do is hypothesize about an algorithm’s potential effects. Regardless, we believe a more explicit focus on
consequences is necessary to make progress.
Second, we recommend decoupling the statistical problem of risk assessment from the policy problem of
designing interventions. At their best, statistical algorithms estimate the likelihood of events under different
scenarios; they cannot dictate policy. An algorithm might (correctly) infer that a defendant has a 20% chance
of committing a violent crime if released, but that fact does not, in and of itself, determine a course of action.
For example, detention is not the only alternative to release, as one could take any number of rehabilitative
interventions (Barabas et al., 2018). Even if detention is deemed an appropriate intervention, one must still
determine what threshold would appropriately balance public safety with the social and financial costs of
detention. One might even decide that society’s goals are best achieved by setting different thresholds for
different groups. For example, a policymaker might reason that, all else equal, the social costs of detaining
a single parent are higher than detaining a defendant without children, and thus decide to apply different
thresholds to the two groups. When policymakers consider these options and others, we believe the primary
role of a risk assessment tool is, as its name suggests, to estimate risk. We note, however, that this view
is at odds with requiring that algorithms satisfy popular fairness criteria, such as anti-classification and
classification parity. Such constrained algorithms typically do not provide the best available estimates of
risk, and thus implicitly conflate the statistical and policy problems.
The field of fair machine learning is still in its infancy, and there are several important avenues of research
that could benefit from new statistical and computational insights. From mitigating measurement error and
sample bias, to understanding the effects of externalities, to building interpretable models, there is much
work to be done. But the benefits are equally large. When carefully designed and evaluated, statistical
risk assessments have the potential to dramatically improve both the efficacy and equity of consequential
decisions. As machine-learning algorithms are increasingly deployed in all walks of life, it will become ever
more important to ensure they are fair.
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